

## APPENDICES—PART II.

### CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, ETC.

#### No. 10.

#### GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS TO SHIPPING IN CASE OF WAR.

(*Instructions to Vessels as to Their Conduct in a Naval War*, and the *Strictly Confidential and Secret* supplement.)

The *Instructions to Shipping* consist entirely of a statement of the principles of international law governing neutrality, prizes, blockade, and contraband. It is noteworthy that in regard to contraband the classification laid down in the Declaration of London is quoted in full, without any warning that the Declaration was not actually recognised as international law.

The "Streng vertraulich und geheim"<sup>1</sup> Supplement, which was issued on the 30th of May, 1912, is more interesting in detail. It begins thus:

"Although there is absolutely no reason to assume that Germany will in the near future be engaged in war with a Greater Power—on the contrary, it may be confidently believed that, as happened last year, not only the German Government but also foreign Governments will take care that war does not break out between principal nations—yet it has been considered worth while to collect the following recommendations, which will be of interest to shipping if a war should happen."

Then follow a note on the "three-mile limit" and a recommendation to make very sure of being within it. Next comes an interesting essay on neutral ports, for which a German master should make directly he gets reliable information that Germany has been attacked:

"War with Holland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal may be considered out of the question. The ports of these countries and their colonies are therefore specially worth consideration when neutral ports are in question.

In the Mediterranean (leaving out of account the Suez Canal) endeavours should be made to reach ports belonging to Turkey, Greece, and, possibly, Italy.

In the Atlantic Ocean the Canaries, the Cape Verde group, and the Azores would be worth considering; in the South Atlantic Brazil or Portuguese South-West Africa, especially the port of St. Paul de Loanda.

---

<sup>1</sup> "Strictly confidential and secret."

Vessels that happen to be in or near South African ports should run for Delagoa Bay if on the outward journey, for the Cape Verde Islands (if possible) when on the journey home.

Vessels in Australian waters should try to reach the Dutch Indies. If they have coal enough, they should avoid the Torres Strait route and go south-about, outside Tasmania, if possible. If they have not enough coal, they are recommended to stay quietly in port, or to run for the port where the best and most economical shelter is to be had—Sydney—and stay there. If the authorities insist on their leaving port, it may then be possible to get coal enough to reach a neutral port (as previously mentioned) without being immediately chased and caught by the enemy.

Vessels making for home *viâ* the Suez Canal should try to reach Marmagao Harbour in Portuguese Goa, or possibly Brewa in Italian Somaliland (about 1° N.). . . .

Vessels with all or most of their cargo on board, which can carry enough coal to take them home *viâ* South America, should take that route. To enter the Straits of Magellan a pilot should be taken as far as Punta Arenas, and another from there on. Charts for the onward voyage could presumably be procured at Punta Arenas.

A vessel that happened to be off the Western Australian coast, and have coal enough to reach the Cape Verde Islands *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope, might take that route.

In these deviations from the regular course especial care must be taken (*a*) to avoid the usual steamer-tracks as much as possible, (*b*) to keep well away from enemy coasts, (*c*) where possible, to enter by night the port that one is making for—further, to make the port as nearly as possible at right angles to the coastline.

In selecting the neutral port to be made for, care must be taken to choose (if possible) one in which at the end of the war coal can be got without its having to be brought there by sea first, *e.g.*, Padang, Delagoa Bay, and on the South American coast, possibly Coronel.

With reference to speeds, it is recommended to proceed at normal full speed in waters not safe from enemy attacks—if circumstances demand it, at even greater speed—but, in areas where no enemy attack is expected, to proceed at economic speed, since at the conclusion of peace coal will be scarce everywhere, and in any case dear. . . ."

While the *Instructions* were published and openly circulated by the Hamburg Shipowners' Union, the *Secret* supplement was circulated by the German-Australian S.S. Company to its own masters only, to be returned to the company—not passed on to a successor—whenever a master resigned or was dismissed.

On these recommendations very little comment need be made. The distrust of Italy is evident, also the basic assurance that Britain at least will be one of the hostile powers; but the neutrality of Portugal is pre-supposed too confidently.