

## CHAPTER XI

### ENTER MUSTAFA KEMAL

“My battalion was on parade when the news of your landing came to us,” said Zeki Bey, in reply to my first question on the point. “It chanced that there had been ordered for that morning an exercise over the ground, especially towards Koja Chemen Tepe [Hill 971]. There had been previous exercises of that sort, and our regiment, the 57th, had mustered early for this one. It was at that moment that the report came.

“The regiment had been camped at Boghali [about two miles north of Kilia Liman on the Dardanelles and exactly four miles directly east of Anzac Cove]. The commander of our division, the 19th, had received about dawn a report from the commander of the 9th Division [which was guarding the coast] that a landing had occurred at Ari Burnu.

“There was one battalion of the 9th Division between the Asmak Dere [two miles north of Anzac] and Kum Dere [three-and-a-half miles south of Gaba Tepe]. I think it was the 1st Battalion of the 27th Regiment; at all events it was one battalion of that regiment. Its other two battalions were west of Maidos [just four miles from Gaba Tepe]. The other regiments of that division were farther south.

“The Turkish staff and commanders concerned did not expect a landing at Ari Burnu, but they had given a great deal of thought to Gaba Tepe, and that was why the two reserve battalions of the 27th Regiment were placed east of Gaba Tepe. Little thought was given to Ari Burnu because it was too precipitous.

"The message from the commander of the 9th Division said: 'About one battalion has landed at Ari Burnu, and this battalion has gone in the direction of Kojia Chemen Tepe.' The message then asked the commander of the 19th Division to send one battalion against Ari




DIAGRAM MADE DURING A TALK WITH ZEKI BEY, SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF THE 9th TURKISH DIVISION, GARRISONING THE SHORES INVADED

(Apparently three battalions, not two, were at Sarafim Farm.)

Burnu from Boghali—because the troops at Boghali were closer to the threatened points than were the 9th Division troops.

"The commander of the 19th Division was Mustafa Kemal Bey—'Bey', that is, I think, equivalent to your 'Major'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Zeki Bey added that a Pasha would probably be "Colonel". He was certainly thinking of the German majors and colonels, whose commands were much higher than those of most British officers of those ranks. Actually (as Zeki Bey told me later) Effendi, Bey and Pasha were titles rather than ranks, and the rank of Mustafa Kemal at this time was apparently equivalent to Lieutenant-Colonel. (The present writer is in error in *Anzac to Amiens*, p. 115.)

This is the first time, so far as I remember, that I heard Mustafa Kemal's name.<sup>2</sup> I may, perhaps, have seen it in one of the intelligence reports at Anzac—"The prisoner gave the name of his divisional commander as Mustafa Kemal Bey." Military intelligence at the British War Office in February 1919 would, of course, have known much better. I fancy they would have said: "Let's see . . . that's the chap that's been commanding the Seventh Turkish Army." Our Light Horse commander Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel, whom we saw a few weeks later at Aleppo, knew still more—Chauvel had just had some troublesome dealing with him over the prescribed demobilisation of the Turkish forces in Syria, and spoke of him, with a twinkle, as "my friend Kemal". But the world in general outside his own country, including war correspondents from the Western Front, was not then aware of his existence. So far as the Mission was concerned Zeki Bey's next words changed all that.

"The regiment was assembled when the order came. Mustafa Kemal came himself, and ordered the regiment and a battery of artillery—mountain guns—to intercept the 'English' who had landed. He reasoned: 'If this force has gone in the direction of Kojia Chemen Tepe, the landing is not a mere demonstration—it is the real thing, the landing of a main force.'

"For that reason he took, not one battalion, as the commander of the 9th Division had asked, but the whole regiment. They went at once straight across country towards the south of Kojia Chemen Tepe—towards Chunuk Bair—Kemal himself leading."

This was vigorous action; how vigorous I only began to realise when Zeki Bey made clear the distribution of responsibility under the plans of Liman von Sanders, German commander of the 5th Army guarding the Dardanelles. "The 19th Division," Zeki Bey told me, "was

---

<sup>2</sup> A photograph of Mustafa Kemal, apparently taken at Anzac, is in *Vol. I* at *p.* 449.

absolutely in reserve under the order of Liman Pasha; it was reserve of the Fifth Army. The XV Army Corps was holding the southern part of the Peninsula; the III Army Corps was holding the north. North of the 9th Division the coast was guarded by gendarmes; and about the same time as the commander of the 9th Division sent word of the Landing to Mustafa Kemal Bey, the gendarmes sent news of it to the III Corps commander, Essad Pasha. He was at Gallipoli [at the northern end of the Peninsula], and he and part of his staff came south to Maidos about 10 a.m.

“But Mustafa Kemal Bey had not waited for that. Although his division was in reserve under the direct orders of General Liman, and had not yet even been allotted to Essad Pasha [as it was soon after], he decided at once to use the 57th Regiment; and later in the day he put in both the other regiments, the 77th and 72nd, which were camped between Boghali and Maidos. All that first day General Liman did not send reinforcements from Gallipoli, because he had always in his head the belief that the real attack would come in the north near Bulair.”

The town of Gallipoli lies twenty-five miles northwest of Anzac and Bulair is about ten miles north of that again, where the Peninsula narrows to a neck before joining the mainland; and here during the Crimean War French and British engineers had constructed the famous fortifications known as the “Bulair Lines”. By seizing this neck an invader could cut off the Peninsula and all its defences from the mainland of Turkey; and to give the impression that this was his intention, the Allies' commander, Sir Ian Hamilton, had arranged that the transports of the Royal Naval Division, which was not to land for some days, and the other transports when they had finished emptying out their troops at Anzac, should steam along the coast to near Bulair, and make an appearance of preparing to land troops there. This (according

to Zeki Bey) confirmed Liman in his belief that the real thrust would be at Bulair.

"When Liman Pasha received the report of the landing at Ari Burnu, he said: 'It's a demonstration, not the true landing.' Seeing the vessels sail for Bulair he said: 'The real landing will be at Bulair.' But those on the spot saw that the ships were empty before they sailed for Bulair."

Zeki Bey impressed on me that, down near Boghali where the 57th Regiment was paraded, Mustafa Kemal had gone off straight across country for the threatened point without awaiting leave or instructions from anyone. The regiment was headed by its 1st Battalion under Zeki Bey. Mustafa Kemal ordered a company to advance 200 yards ahead of the battalion; and with this company he went himself, a small map in his hand; and beside him Zeki Bey.


"Probably," Zeki Bey told me, "Mustafa Kemal didn't know where Ari Burnu was; on the little maps which we then had it was not marked by name. 'Bee Point' was perhaps the name given to it by the garrison of the 27th Regiment. Decent maps were then being prepared, but they weren't ready." However, Kemal *was* impressed by the importance of Koja Chemen Tepe—or of Chunuk Bair, which was practically the same position. He directed the march so as to meet the "English" before they could get there.

On reaching a valley south of Chunuk Bair (that is, one of the deep ravines behind Third Ridge some way north of Scrubby Knoll), Zeki Bey said, they met Turkish soldiers who came tumbling down the side of the valley. These men told Mustafa Kemal that they had been pushed back, and that numbers of troops had landed about Ari Burnu.

"Mustafa Kemal Bey had then two battalions ahead, 1st and 2nd, and one—the 3rd—in rear. He had lost the commander of our regiment, who had gone in another

direction, and so he gave the order directly to me—that my battalion, the 1st, must without losing a minute vigorously attack the troops who were coming up the main hill-range, and push them back into the sea. At the same time he placed the mountain battery in position, just north of Kemal Yere—that is Kemal Hill—as it was afterwards called [Scrubby Knoll]. The 2nd Battalion was to advance on the right of mine; he kept only one battalion, the 3rd, in reserve.

“At this time we were only under the fire of the warships. But the advance was very difficult because we had come straight across country, and by the time when Mustafa Kemal Bey told me to attack my men were scattered and it was possible to get at only part of them. It was when I was searching for them, looking out from Third Ridge near Chunuk Bair, that I first saw the Australians. There was a line of them on the inland slope of Dus Tepe [Straight Hill, i.e. Battleship Hill] and they were advancing. Some soldiers of my battalion had crossed one of the valleys between me and the Australians—I think it was Dik Dere [Deep Valley, i.e. the valley in which lay the three sandpits, and along whose edge our Mission had found the spent ammunition of a Turkish firing line] and had attacked the Australians so closely that it seemed as if the bayonets might be used. I could see a line of men of my battalion on the spur. Opposite them was a line of Australians and near the upper end of this line an officer was standing, pointing with what looked to me like a sword—though it may have been a stick. He was pointing at the men of my battalion opposite him, who were retiring. A lieutenant of my battalion was there, holding on; I could see him, and saw him fall and his men retire. His men came back into Dik Dere. I shouted to the men with me to shoot at the Australian who seemed to be encouraging his men to go forward after my retiring men. On reaching the valley my soldiers moved southwards along it. Presently I saw



THE ANZAC POSITION, VIEWED FROM WHERE MUSTAFA KEMAL BEY SAW IT ON THE MORNING OF 25th APRIL 1915. (HE PLACED HIS HEADQUARTERS AT THE POINT FROM WHICH THE SKETCH WAS MADE, JUST NORTH OF SCRUBBY KNOLL, AND STATIONED A MOUNTAIN BATTERY BESIDE HIM LATER THE HEADQUARTERS BECAME THAT OF ESSAD PASHA, COMMANDING THE "NORTH-ERN GROUP". AND THE OBSERVATION POST SHOWN IN THE FOREGROUND WAS CONSTRUCTED)

W.G. Wire Gully (nick in skyline).

C. Courtney's Post.

M.R. Mortar Ridge.

B. 700. Baby 700.

B'p H. Battleship Hill.

T. Tulloch's farthest point.

X. Point from which Turks fired.

160. Hill 160 (or 261), southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair.

S. Su Yatagha, eastern shoulder of Chunuk Bair.

U.L. Western branch of Usun Dere.

U.R. Eastern branch of Usun Dere.

the Australians, who were in a little bunch, take cover in the scrub.

"I myself had then been wounded; I was shot through the arm while I was standing up. But I could not have the wound attended to yet, as the situation was critical. I went down into Dik Dere to see what had happened to my soldiers. When I got there I found that the soldiers, who had retired on the right and gone down through the dere to the left, were not demoralised; but they had come under the fire of their own mountain battery—I think that is what prevented your troops also from advancing. The lieutenant whom I had seen wounded had been hit through the neck but was holding on, and his troops whom I had seen retiring were reinforcing the line farther south in the dere and were quite unshaken.

"The two battalions of the regiment drove your advanced troops back from Battleship Hill. I was sent away to hospital at 4 o'clock or 4.30.<sup>3</sup> In the afternoon the fighting had become severe. At first our soldiers met only weak troops and pushed them back. The guns were able to do good work. They couldn't fire on the Beach because it was too steep, so they fired down the long slope on your troops. The 2nd Battalion of our regiment attacked between my battalion and the sea and got to about the Fishermen's Huts. At the time when I left the 3rd Battalion was just coming up in reserve behind the left of my battalion. Farther south was the 27th Regiment. The battalion of the 27th<sup>4</sup> had all its company commanders hit, three killed, one wounded but still carrying on; and most of its younger officers were dead or wounded. The leading company of my battalion had one officer killed and one wounded.

"At dusk the 3rd Battalion of my regiment was

---

<sup>3</sup> I suspect that, as constantly happened, Zeki Bey thought he had been with the troops longer than he actually was.

<sup>4</sup> I think this refers to the battalion which had garrisoned the coast at Anzac and Gaba Tepe.

ordered to attack between the 1st and 2nd and to carry the attack to the sea. The 2nd Battalion, attacking on the seaward side, got, as I said, to the Fishermen's Huts or near them but didn't come back. The commander of this battalion himself went forward during the night to find his men and came back to report that there were only 'English' ahead, his own men were all gone. The regimental commander, Ahuni Bey, was rather upset by this report. But at that moment there came in also a report from the C.O. of the 3rd Battalion which had got to Jessaret Tepe [Hill of Courage, Russell's Top at The Nek]. He said that he was well ahead with his troops. They were weak, about 80 or 90 men, and he was a bit anxious lest, if attacked, they might not be able to hold; he needed reinforcements. But he added that things were then fairly quiet about there, and he thought that the 'English' were too exhausted to attack. His report was made with coolness; the general impression was that the commander of the 2nd Battalion had lost his head, while the C.O. of the 3rd Battalion, Hairi Bey, had kept his. At regimental headquarters—in Usun Dere [Long Valley]<sup>5</sup> Ahuni Bey was greatly reassured by this report.

"That same night the 77th (Arab) Regiment came in to the south of the 57th, between it and the 27th Regiment. The two battalions of the 27th which in the first instance had been camped west of Maidos to resist any landing at Gaba Tepe, had early been ordered to send their troops straight towards the sea. They had come into the fight farther south than the 57th Regiment. In the night, the 77th Regiment coming in behind and between the 57th and 27th began to fire before it reached the

---

<sup>5</sup> On the Turkish map given to me by Zeki Bey, Usun Dere is the valley next behind Dik Dere and immediately in front of the northern end of Third Ridge. On the other hand my note of Zeki Bey's account of these events says that Usun Dere "forks to the right of Chatal Dere into Battleship Hill". That would be the valley at the head of which Mustafa Kemal afterwards had his divisional headquarters close to the nick between Battleship Hill and Chunuk Bai. He probably took over the old regimental headquarters.

front line. The 27th Regiment coming under this fire, and thinking that the 57th was shooting into it, was all night crying out to the 57th not to fire; and the 57th in the same way was calling to the 27th. The 77th was an Arab regiment, and the Arabs understood neither of the others. For this reason there was a panic and a lot of disorganisation—and the 77th was later sent to the Gaba Tepe end of the line, because that flank was quiet and the regiment had not much value.

“Towards evening of that first day there was sent up to the right flank the 72nd Regiment—the other regiment of the 19th Division. This regiment, too, was composed of Arabs. They were brought up towards Dus Tepe [Battleship Hill] to reinforce the 2nd Battalion of my regiment, which was by now pretty weak. That first day no reinforcements came from Gallipoli in the north because Liman Pasha thought the 5th Division up there would be needed at Bulair. They got ready the ships, however, to bring troops down if necessary. Essad Pasha, commander of the III Corps, came down, as I said, from Gallipoli to Mal Tepe. He approved what Mustafa Kemal had done. All the troops were under Mustafa Kemal Pasha that day and Essad merely helped him.”<sup>6</sup>

I think Zeki Bey mentioned to me that at one time on April 25th some Turkish commander reported that the “English” at Ari Burnu had been driven back into the sea. At all events it was with reference to some such report that he told me: “Your troops from Dus Tepe [Battleship Hill] retired to the sea shore and remained there covered by the fire of their warships. The Turkish troops got about to Jessaret Tepe [The Nek]. They might

---

<sup>6</sup> General Aspinall-Oglander, in the *British Official History*, says that between 7 and 8 a.m. Liman von Sanders, hearing of the landings at Kum Kale (south of the Straits) and Cape Helles, sent Essad Pasha south to take charge of the 9th and 19th Divisions. Mustafa Kemal, after leading the 57th Regiment to action, hurried back to Essad, received from him approval of what he had done, and was authorised to take the two other regiments (77th and 72nd) from Army Reserve. As to the 72nd, see Zeki Bey's letter in *Appendix III*.

have done better, but the troops on their left were Arabs, and they panicked and came running round behind the 57th Regiment.<sup>7</sup>

"It was also reported to Constantinople that some of the troops who landed at Ari Burnu had been captured. About the third day Constantinople wanted to know when these prisoners were coming along. It was then reported that it was a mistake—there had been some misunderstanding. The Turkish soldiers thought that some of your men were going to surrender; your soldiers thought that some Turks were going to do the same. Some troops had surrendered, but others came up meanwhile—there was a complication, and an inquiry was held afterwards."

This probably was the Turkish interpretation of an incident that occurred on the first night. At the head of Monash Valley a surviving group of the 11th Battalion told Colonel H. Pope of the 16th, which arrived in the dark to reinforce them, that Indians were fighting on their left—a notion which had been current there since 4.30 p.m. and which allowed part of a Turkish battalion (III/57th) to penetrate along that side of Russell's Top. Pope sent three of his officers and men who could speak Hindustani along the edge of Pope's Hill towards The Nek to get in touch with these "Indians". As he could hear talk, and his men did not return, Pope followed them only to realise just in time, from some movement of the strangers in the dark, that these were Turks. He

---

<sup>7</sup> This statement of Zeki Bey's was made, of course, at second-hand; when the events happened he was on his way to hospital. But he possibly heard that Russell's Top had that night lain open to the Turks. He would not, however, know that Walker's Ridge, leading from the Top, near The Nek, down to the sea, was held by a strong and unshaken force of Australians and New Zealanders under Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Braund (vegetarian, theosophist, and invincible) and Brigadier-General H. B. Walker (a cultured Englishman and the one general at Anzac who that day fought like a tiger against any suggestion of withdrawal). In three days' fighting this force finally held the Top against stronger attacks than any previously made.

plunged into the gully, shots following him, and got back to his battalion, but his three envoys were captured. As only one other Australian—a bugler who mistook another gully for Monash Valley, and was clubbed there—was captured, the prisoners referred to by Zeki Bey were almost certainly Colonel Pope's envoys.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> For the full story see *Vol. I*, pp. 468-70.