International conference 1918 Year of Victory
International conference 1918 Year of Victory
Synopses of papers
Day 1 Thursday 27 November
8.45 am - Opening by Hon Alan Griffin MP, Minister for Veterans' Affairs
9.00 am - Keynote address: 1918: the road to victory
Professor Jay Winter (Yale University)
The reasons one side wins a war are not always the same as the reasons the other side loses. The military, political, and social history of 1918 in Europe shows the force of this distinction. The German war effort unravelled completely in 1918, but that process was not visible to many observers at the start of the year. On the contrary, if you were a neutral observer in early November 1917 and surveyed the geopolitical balance of forces in Europe, you would have had to be clairvoyant to predict the collapse of the Central Powers precisely twelve months later.
To understand the sources of German defeat in 1918 we must turn to the nature of the German state and the disastrous military, political, and economic decisions taken by the leadership since the start of the war. German defeat was built into the structure of the war effort of the Kaiserreich. The fact that defeat was deferred for so long requires explanation. The key arguments here are twofold:
(1) Allied blunders and misconceptions were at times as disastrous as those of the German leadership. The failures of Haig, Churchill, Nivelle, and Kerensky, among others, enabled Germany to avoid the logical consequence of her profound strategic disadvantages, which arose out of the greater capacity of the Allies to solve the problems of supply and distribution, at the heart of industrial warfare.
(2) The strength and sophistication of the German army, in particular in defensive positions, enabled it to hold its own and to win on the Eastern fronts long after their overall strategic position in the war had become untenable. After March 1918, everything came apart: tactics, strategy, and the logistics of industrialized warfare. Front and home front unravelled at the same time, requiring Germany to seek out an Armistice ending a war she could never have won in the first place.
10.00 am - Morning tea
Session 1 - Turning defeat into victory, 1918
10.30 am - Stabbed in the front: the German defeat in the West, 1918, and the myth of the Armistice
Professor Robin Prior (University of Adelaide)
This paper seeks to investigate the manner in which the British army in particular, outfought the Germans in 1918 and whether the military events of that year amounted to a crushing military defeat. It then moves on to investigate whether the Germans, with an army still in the field, were tricked into agreeing to terms that did not reflect the military reality at the front.
11.30 am - Finest hour? The British Expeditionary Force’s operations on the Western Front in 1918
Professor Gary Sheffield (University of Birmingham)
This paper will examine the performance of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1918, concentrating mainly on formations and troops from the British Isles. It will begin by discussing how the BEF survived the traumas of the German spring offensives, arguing that the battles were a defensive victory for the Allies, not merely battles that the Germans happened to lose: the Germans did not ‘defeat themselves’. It will go on to look at the BEF in the Hundred Days, looking particularly at the advance to the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of the St Quentin canal. The paper will examine such matters as tactics, the operational level, command and control, logistics and morale and cohesion of the army, and end by offering some comparisons with the British army of the Second World War.
12.30 pm Lunch
Session 2 - The major powers at war, 1918
1.30 pm - From victory to defeat: the German army in 1918
Dr Robert Foley (University of Liverpool)
In March 1918, the German army began a series of major offensives that achieved success unprecedented for the First World War. Ripping massive holes in the British and French defensive lines, the Germans advanced deep into their enemy's rear areas. Yet, within months, the German army was staring defeat in the face. This paper will explore the reasons behind the ultimate failure of the German 1918 offensives and the ultimate German collapse in 1918—and will look at the close links between the two events.
2.15 pm - A French victory, 1918
Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh (University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy)
This paper will counter the often expressed view that France has lost every war in which it has been involved since Napoleon. To read some accounts of the last months of the First World War is to receive the impression that there were no French on the Western Front at all. Equally, Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s role in 1918 has been disparaged and the value of unified command itself questioned.
These misconceptions will be countered by analyses of: the military operations that the French Army undertook in 1918; the industrial mobilisation that enabled France to arm and equip the American Army as well as its own troops; and the contribution of the Allied generalissimo who drew up the military terms of the Armistice that were presented to the Germans in November 1918.
3.00 pm - Afternoon tea
3.30 pm - The cost of inexperience: Americans on the Western Front, 1918
Ms Meleah Ward (University of Adelaide)
By early 1918, the American Expeditionary Force had one million men in France, and was steadily expanding. The impact of the Americans on the military conduct of the war, however, was not proportionate to this strength in numbers. The performance of the AEF was hindered by the reluctance of Major-General John Pershing and other commanders to absorb new techniques developed specifically for conditions on the Western Front, preferring instead to emphasise the old-fashioned doctrine of rifle and bayonet. But the social composition of the AEF also had serious implications for their performance in battle. A large percentage of poorly-educated conscripts meant that there were few men qualified to act as NCOs, a distinct problem when combined with a high officer casualty rate. While the doughboys were keen in battle, these fundamental problems proved hard to resolve, and limited their effectiveness in combat.
4.15 pm - Fighting to exhaustion: morale, discipline and combat effectiveness in the armies of 1918
Mr Ashley Ekins (Australian War Memorial)
The final battles of 1918 on the Western Front produced some of the most sustained and costly fighting of the war. By autumn, after four long years of war, many national armies were fighting at the limits of their endurance. Some had begun to reveal symptoms of disintegration: high rates of desertion, combat refusals and even debilitating mutinies.
Of all the major forces, only the British and American armies remained untroubled by mass mutinies during the war. This raises significant questions that have never been satisfactorily resolved. Why did some troops refuse to fight while others continued to obey military orders? What motivated troops to continue to fight? What was the relationship between troop indiscipline and fighting capacity? This paper will explore these and related questions through a comparison of military justice within different national armies to examine how declining troop morale and rising levels of indiscipline affected combat performance.
5.00 pm - Close of day one
Evening - Opening of exhibition Over the front: the Great War in the air, ANZAC Hall (by invitation only)
Day 2 Friday 28 November
Session 3 - Dominion armies and the advance to victory, 1918
9.00 am - Maintaining the advance: Monash, battle procedure and the Australian Corps in 1918
Dr Peter Pedersen (Australian War Memorial)
Battle procedure is the concurrent action needed to ensure that a force enters battle quickly, thoroughly prepared and fully supported. An essential tool at every level of command, it is especially important in times of crisis. This paper discusses the effectiveness of battle procedure in the operations of the Australian Corps in 1918, and those under Monash’s command in particular.
9.45 am - Bloody Bapaume: New Zealand soldiers battle for the town, August–September 1918
Associate Professor Glyn Harper (Massey University)
The battle for the important junction town of Bapaume was the first major engagement of the New Zealand Division in the great August offensive of 1918. Rather than the walkover many commanders expected, the battle to secure Bapaume was a protracted, brutal action which resulted in many New Zealand casualties. It also saw a significant number of military innovations for the New Zealanders and Bapaume is the only battle in New Zealand's history where more than two Victoria Crosses have been awarded. Despite being little known today, the battle of Bapaume was one of the most costly and hard-fought battles ever undertaken by the New Zealand Division on the Western Front; a fact never acknowledged by the New Zealand Divisional commander or by New Zealand military historians since. This paper examines why this was so.
10.30 am - Morning tea
11.00 am - Bloody victory: the Canadian Corps in the Hundred Days campaign
Dr Tim Cook (Canadian War Museum)
This talk will explore the role of the Canadian Corps in the Hundred Days campaign. It examines how the Canadians fought these engagements through an analysis of the key battles of Amiens, Arras, and Canal du Nord. These final battles confirmed the reputation of the Canadian Corps as shock troops—but while these victories were the most impressive in the annals of Canadian military history, they were also the most costly.
Session 4 - Other fronts: the war at sea and in the air, 1918
11.45 am - Victory at sea, 1918
Dr David Stevens (Sea Power Centre) and Rear Admiral James Goldrick (Australian Defence College)
Ninety years after its ending there still remains little public understanding of the Great War at sea; a conflict, which although less bloody than the land war, had its own unique impact on final Allied victory. Much that has been written rests upon assumptions which are fundamentally mistaken, or upon analysis which has long since been overtaken by discriminating research. Even the official histories can no longer be considered to present a credible narrative, let alone a comprehensive account.
This paper presents a fresh and intriguing perspective on the maritime war and its influence on the wider conduct of operations, dealing in turn with such matters as economics, technology and command and control. Specific areas to be covered will include an assessment of the global operations to protect shipping, planned and executed operations in the North Sea and Mediterranean, the impact of the maritime blockade on the Central Powers and the final German decision to surrender.
12.30 pm - Lunch
1.15 pm - Victory in the air, 1918
Mr Peter Hart (Imperial War Museum)
The dominant images of the Great War are of trench warfare, massive armies locked in bloody industrialised slaughter on the ground. When it is remembered at all, the air war has been romanticised through images of the aces and their supposed chivalrous battles in the skies above. This image is far from reality and has tended to both glamorise and marginalise the achievements of those who fought in the air. This paper will examine the real priorities of the Royal Flying Corps/RAF in 1918. At the heart of everything was still detailed photographic reconnaissance and artillery observation work. But new priorities were increasingly forcing their way onto the agenda. Hundreds of aircraft would fly low over the battlefield engaging in ground strafing of German troops, gun batteries and supply columns. Bombing raids attacked the airfields of the German Air Service. Interdiction bombing was slowly becoming more effective; while strategic air raids sought to damage crucial munitions factories far behind the lines. In 1918 the scope of the air war spread from the heights of 23,000 feet right down to ground level; it reached from the front lines back to the national industrial heartlands and it was increasingly a 24 hour, seven day week affair. War in the air had reached an impressive maturity of both purpose and achievement.
Session 5 - Panel discussion: who won the Great War—and how?
2.00 pm - International panel, chaired by Professor Jay Winter (Yale University)
Professor Robin Prior (University of Adelaide)
Professor Gary Sheffield (University of Birmingham)
Dr Robert Foley (University of Liverpool)
3.00 pm - Afternoon tea
Session 6 - Armistice and aftermath
3.30 pm - The peace settlement of 1919: prelude to the Second World War?
Professor Trevor Wilson (University of Adelaide)
It was the intransigence of the French in the aftermath of World War One, according to J.R. Colville, “which bred the bitterness and despair upon which Hitler rose to power.” (Colville was, successively, private secretary to the Prime Ministers Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. He was writing in October 1939.) At the same time the widely–read historian Arthur Bryant was writing that the German High Command back in late 1918, convinced that further resistance was no longer practicable, “accepted terms as humiliating as any offered to a defeated army in the modern annals.” When Colville and Bryant both wrote, it should be noticed, Britain was again at war with Germany. Yet that did not cause them to amend their judgements.
Do the terms of the Treaty of Versailles deserve these hostile judgements? Were the provisions of the 14 Points really violated as brutally as Bryant proclaims? These questions, so rarely asked, deserve to be discussed.
4.15 pm - The veterans’ voice: The Returned Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia, 1916-1919
Dr Martin Crotty (University of Queensland)
The end of World War I in November 1918 brought the issues of return and repatriation into much sharper focus. Governments were concerned to reintegrate returned soldiers peacefully and, hopefully, at reasonably expense. Returned soldiers were anxious to ensure that they were fairly compensated for their wartime service, and that they and their families would, if physically wounded or otherwise incapacitated, be adequately provided for.
The RSSILA, the dominant and officially recognised and supported returned soldiers’ association in Australia, was the primary organisation within and through which the returned soldiers formulated and expressed their demands on government. It was, and has remained, a major influence in the shaping of repatriation policies and thus of the lives of returned soldiers.
This paper considers the early years of the RSL, from its formation in mid-1916 through until the end of 1919. The paper will concentrate on the overall philosophy and tactics used by the RSL in building itself into a mass organisation with considerable political influence—to the extent that by the end of 1919 the major repatriation demands of soldiers had been acceded to by the Commonwealth government.
5.00 pm - Closing address by Professor Jay Winter (Yale University)
7.30 pm - TBC Conference dinner, ANZAC Hall
After-dinner talk: Those magnificent men and the Great War
Mr Peter Burness (Australian War Memorial)
