Interview with Lieut-General Sir Thomas Daly

An interview with Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly produced by Army Training Command. Appointment as Adjutant of the 2/10 Battalion AIF. The type of training carried out at the formation of the battalion. Officers and NCOs who joined the Battalion from the Militia were first class. Fifty per cent of the subalterns came from the ranks. Comments on how generating a battalion spirit was achieved. The battalion formed in Adelaide where the spirit of the 10 battalion 1st AIF was very much alive. The battalion was proud of the first 10th and proud of Adelaide. Imposition of strict discipline. Officers put on parades. Early formation of the battalion band. All this contributed to build the battalion spirit. Asked if the training program change in overseas deployment [ the 2/10 went to Great Britain]. Operational on arrival with most of the time spent on operational exercises. Special training in anti-gas, anti-tank suing Boyes Anti Tank rifle 7 Molotov cocktails and anti-aircraft using small arms. Promotion to Major and deployment to Egypt. Toughening up training, practice in desert warfare and Brigade exercises. No work with armour or artillery. In 1941 the battalion committed to Tobruk - asked how the 12 months of training stood up to combat operations. Weakness revealed in communications. The Infantry had to operate with artillery time programs. Impossible directions from up above. A lot depended on the initiative by junior officers. Examples of the capture and loss of Posts F6 and F7. Considers experience to be the best form of training. Asked to cite examples of the use of previous experience. Leslie Morsheads' program of aggressive patrols and raiding and his own example in Korea. Explains why the posting of officers and NCOs from Battalion to 18 Training Battalion on a rotational basis was set up. Points which contributed to success of the defence of Tobruk. The aggressive patrols and raiding contributed to the loss of morale among the Germans and Italians. The defence in depth. Good hygiene practices - mentions that in Gallipoli more casualties resulted from dysentery than combat. Opinions of the Australian soldier at Tobruk and the character of the Australian soldier. New Guinea - staff and training appointments - asked if he saw any emphasis in training for jungle warfare in New Guinea. Tactics didn't differ except for visibility. Asked if jungle warfare force responsibilities to the lower commands being the company, platoon and section commanders. Salamaua campaign - visiting brigade Headquarters. After battle reports for doctrine update. October 1944 appointed to command 2/10 Battalion. Instituted individual training, fire and movement training and field fire exercises. Trained to take out Japanese bunkers and how to fire close to own troops. Company commanders walk out between troops in field firing. Asked how reinforcements were made to feel part of the battalion. Loss of South Australian identity - now almost as many Queenslanders - thought it was a good thing. Oboe 6 and the capture of Borneo. Training in amphibious warfare. Learned lessons from the American experiences - the need for deeper beach head. Problems with Japanese pillboxes and bunkers. Exercises on getting out of Landing Ships and Landing Craft. Sport and training. 7 Division arrival at Morotai prior to Balkipapan. Preparation and training in the staging area. Use of terrain model. Battalion set up information centre. Daly personally briefed every Battalion Company and every Corporal given a photograph of the area in which they would operate. Toughening up training. Japanese still on Morotai. Describes the landing at Balikpapan and deployment of the Battalion companies. Gives reasons for pressing on inland up feature 87 a spur. Japanese firing from Green Spur. Corporal Simmons MM. Use of flame throwers to clear out Japanese bunkers. Parramatta ridge. Types of leadership. Need of leadership at Section level. Control of the battalion during battle at Peterson Junction.