Ian Graham McNeill as a Military Historian, Official History Vietnam War interviewed by Greg Swanborough for 'The sharp end'

Places
Accession Number F10607
Collection type Film
Measurement 13 min 42 sec
Object type To be confirmed
Physical description 16mm/colour (Eastman)/sound
Maker Petersen, Joel
Swanborough, Greg
McNeill, Ian Graham
Swanborough, Greg
Gentle, Victor
Date made 25 May 1992
Access Open
Conflict Period 1990-1999
Vietnam, 1962-1975
Copyright

Item copyright: AWM Licensed copyright

Copying Provisions Copyright restrictions apply. Permission of copyright holder required for any use and/or reproduction.
Description

Scene 6 Takes 1 Roll 9. The strategy of operation Rolling Thunder was to bomb North Vietnam to bring them to conference table; the strategy didn’t work and on 6 March US Marines landed in Da Dang; bombing persisted through the entire war and only in December1972 when B-52 bombed Hanoi did it force the North Vietnamese to come to a cease fire agreement; thinks the that the whole bombing campaign was not a success; Take 2 Roll 9. describes the AATTV and the reason why they were sent; a Australian support with the United States against Communist subversion in South Vietnam; from the first the Defence Committee linked their decision to the success of the Australian forces countering insurgency in Malaya; background of the AATTV was mainly infantry through some were signals and engineers and about half had Malayan experience; AATTV was made up of Sergeants, Warrant Officers and junior Officers; Scene Take 3 Roll 9. outlines the decision made by Prime Minister to send a Task Force the smallest unit to be independent; the battalion previously committed was under a US Brigade (173rd Airborne ) and therefore could not practice its’ own doctrine of counter insurgency; at the same time the US was asking for more troops; the Task Force was much a desire of the Defence Department and the base was established away from the Americans at Nui Dat; Scene 35. takes 1 &2 the effects of the US policy of Vietnamization were most felt by the AATTV; as the US left the Central Highlands small South Vietnamese units were put in their place; the AATTV found themselves fighting North Vietnamese units of superior strength; this occurred with Special Forces such as the Montagnards; Scene 35 Take 3. the true meaning of Vietnamization was a way to reduce US casualties and to get the US out of Vietnam and hoping to leave the Vietnamese to carry on as best they could; explains the tier system of the Vietnamese armed forces similar to the Communists –popular, regional forces, the ARVN and Special Forces; the Montagnards were not Vietnamese citizens and could not serve in the Vietnamese forces; they were recruited by and paid for by the United States; the AATTV trained and operated throughout the whole South Vietnamese system. Scene 35 take 5 Roll 9. the AATTV felt most comfortable with the ARVN but the most important were the regional popular forces; these had their own loyalties and the AATTV learnt how to work with them; training in low level infantry operations stood them in good stead; the system supported them that they became good at their job. Scene 40 Take 1. when the Labor Government was elected in 1972 the Prime Minister Whitlam sent message to tell the AATTV to leave within ten days; the order to leave was seen by the AATTV as a breach of honour; the armistice was signed one month latter. Roll 10. Takes 1&2. the primary roll of the Task Force was to assist in the restoration of Government control in Phuoc Tuy Province; the second role was to keep open the strategic highway between Saigon and Vung Tau; another role was the ability to move out of Phuoc Tuy into other provinces that made up III Corps; pacification role in the cordon and search of villages with government approval; the Task Force succeeded in reducing the influence of the Viet Cong and the Province was flourishing; the Viet Cong infrastructure remained but the Viet Cong units dissipated and were reduced in strength; last Task Force commander stated in 1971 that looking for the enemy was like looking for a needle in a hay stack; when the task force left this situation did not continue slowly there was an erosion; from the Australian point of view we did not lose and had succeeded in carrying out our roles but the whole situation was not tenable.