Lessons of the Korean War, 65 years on
Open hostilities in the Korean War ended on 27 July 1953, six and a half decades ago. Yet strangely enough, the armistice ending open hostilities that was signed at that time remains the poignant symbol of an incomplete conclusion – of a war that retains a distinct possibility of resuming at short notice.
The names of the leaders have changed and the character of the forces arrayed against each other have evolved over time. But the United Nations Command, to which Australia actively contributed forces, remains; and the United States Forces in Korea, alongside the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces, continue to practise military drills, just in case. Indeed, Australia has been an active participant in recent years as well.
So what did Australia contribute to the Korean War from June 1950 to July 1953? What were the Australians doing there? How significant was the contribution and what difference did it make? And what has that meant for Australia since then, and what might that mean for Australia in mid-2018?
Australians in post-war Japan
As the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the Australian-led British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), headquartered in Kure, Japan, was preparing to pack up and close down. It had been there as an occupation force since the end of the Second World War, and it was leaving in anticipation that the post-war rehabilitation was complete and that control would be handed over from the US-led occupying forces to the people of Japan.
The BCOF presence had shrunk considerably from an initial 40,000-strong group. That force had deployed to Japan in early 1946. It initially included a two-brigade-strong British–Indian Division, the New Zealand 9th Brigade, and the Australian 34th Brigade – as well as air force squadrons from Australia, New Zealand, Britain and India, and vessels from the British Pacific Fleet, and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). But the anticipated resistance to the occupation failed to emerge, and BCOF quickly shrank to a considerably smaller force – one predominantly operated by Australians. Australia remained engaged in large part to ensure that its concerns about a possible military resurgence of Japan did not materialise, and also to influence the post-war treaty arrangements with Japan. Australia wanted to encourage continued US engagement in the region and to bolster ties with its wartime ally, with whom a treaty alliance had not yet been concluded.
Australia’s naval contribution
For the RAN, the Korean War marked continuity and change. Drawing on skills and procedures for inter-operability refined during the Second World War, the RAN was quick to deploy ships in support of the US-led and UN-mandated fight against the North Koreans. The RAN maintained two warships on station throughout the war, starting with HMAS Shoalhaven, an Australian-built frigate launched in 1944 – tasked with patrols and escort duties in the Yellow Sea alongside other British Commonwealth forces commanded by a British rear admiral. A month later, HMAS Bataan, an Australian-built destroyer commissioned in 1945, was involved in a naval bombardment near the site of the Inchon landings. The RAN participated alongside British and American task groups in a way that confirmed the need for a professional RAN to be maintained for operations with allies.
Change came with the establishment of the RAN Fleet Air Arm in 1948, following the purchase of two light aircraft carriers, HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Sydney. HMAS Sydney was the first, received by the RAN in 1949 and deployed on request to Korean waters in 1951, replacing Britain’s HMS Glory in that role. The ship operated on the more restricted waters off Korea’s west coast. It came with a mix of a dozen Fairey Fireflys (a single-engine, two-seat anti-submarine reconnaissance and strike aircraft) and two dozen Hawker Sea Fury single-seat fighter bombers, armed with machine-guns and rockets. Targets for strike operations included artillery positions, coastal shipping, troop concentrations, roads, rails, bridges and vehicles. Many of these aircraft were hit by North Korean artillery flak, and while the majority returned to the carrier for repairs, 13 aircraft were lost. The ship maintained a high tempo of operations over the four months of its deployment in late 1951 and early 1952, despite maintenance and deck crews operating at times in severe conditions, enduring Typhoon Ruth and losing aircraft overboard, but no personnel. HMAS Sydney returned to Australia early in 1952, and thereafter Australia maintained two warships on station until well after the armistice was signed. In the end, some 4,500 RAN personnel served on operations in Korean waters, with five killed and six wounded, but the RAN did not again send an aircraft carrier to fight in the Korean War.
The navy after Korea
The RAN’s Fleet Air Arm would continue after the war, but there was fluctuating government enthusiasm for maintaining a strong aircraft carrier–based offensive military capability. Arguably, the air operations conducted over Korea provided an inadequate return on the investment. Operational aircraft carriers are costly to maintain, and governments like to see a clear and prominent return on their investment, particularly in coalition settings. Enthusiasm ebbed as the technology involved became more complex and expensive, and the national defence strategy changed from forward defence to the defence of Australia. With a shift away from supporting fixed-wing operations far from Australian shores, the last of the two aircraft carriers, HMAS Melbourne, was decommissioned by 1982, leaving the RAN with no carriers from which to conduct fixed-wing operations. Ironically, it was the Falklands War in 1982 that sealed the fate for the RAN, as the aircraft carrier Australia had planned to acquire from Britain, HMS Invincible, was withdrawn from sale due to its proven utility and importance for the success of Britain’s campaign to retake the Falkland Islands. Australia overlooked the significance of such capabilities for force projection. Indeed, it can be argued that Australia is a middle power which tends to act with small power pretensions, and as a result has shied away from seeking to maintain the ability to project force in such an overt way, in and beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
In recent years, however, Australian governments have recognised that an island nation requires some self-reliant force projection capabilities. The East Timor crisis in 1999, in addition to other earlier crises in the Pacific, brought this message home particularly clearly. Subsequently, the RAN has commissioned HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide. These ships are categorised as Landing Helicopter Dock ships (LHDs) rather than aircraft carriers, even though their flight decks are larger than those found on HMAS Sydney or HMAS Melbourne, and are in fact designed to take fixed-wing aircraft. Still, the prospect of fixed-wing aircraft operating from these new ships remains remote, although drones are already in use.
The new amphibious configuration, focused on helicopters and the ability to carry and offload stores and equipment across shorelines, supported by drones, reflects a shift in the Australian approach, which emphasises a closer integration of Australian land, air and maritime capabilities as a joint force. It is unlikely but not inconceivable that an Australian naval task group could once more deploy to zones of conflict, as was the case during the Korean War, so the navy maintains a suite of warfighting capabilities that echo those employed during the Korean War. But perhaps ground forces best show the enduring parallels with the Korean War and its significance.
Land forces in Korea
In June 1950, it was the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) that remained as the last Australian land combat force stationed with BCOF in Japan. It was an infantry unit with equipment from the Second World War and with reduced personnel, having its numbers thinned in anticipation of an imminent return to Australia. But under the dynamic and forceful leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Green, 3RAR was quick to deploy and played a prominent part within the 27th Commonwealth Brigade as part of General MacArthur’s UN Command.
The contribution of one infantry battalion was very much smaller than Australia had mustered at the height of the Second World War, when Australia fielded 14 divisions. In March 1952, Australia’s contribution to the Korean War expanded to include two infantry battalions and supporting elements that formed the nucleus of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade; thus command of the brigade passed from British to Australian leadership. This composite brigade was part of the 1st Commonwealth Division, which also included the Canadian 25th Brigade and the British 29th Brigade. The post-war Australian approach would focus on deploying smaller and more professional forces.
The significance of Australia’s contribution, alongside that of Britain, Canada and New Zealand, went beyond the actual units involved. In fact, the influence of these English-speaking countries was disproportionate, with the British Commonwealth forces able to bargain collectively with their American counterparts to gain favourable standing for the Commonwealth forces in the war.
Australian troops consolidated their professional reputation for operations in the more fluid stages of the war, in 1950 and into 1951. They played a leading role in the advance to and retreat from the Yalu River, and in consolidating the defensive line along what would eventually become the demilitarised zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. 3RAR played a leading role at the battle of Kapyong in late April 1951, alongside the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry and other elements of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. These included artillery support from the New Zealand gunners, an American armoured unit, and British command and control support, as well as British combat troops in reserve. The battle of Kapyong was the first time the so-called “five eyes” countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and United Kingdom) had operated together in a single land combat formation. It would not be their last, but it set the tone for more than half a century of close collaboration, cross-examination and sharing of experiences and burdens as part of what has come to be known as the ABCANZ partnership between the armies (and marine forces) of the five countries.
After the battle of Kapyong, the designations shifted and Australia’s 3RAR became part of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. There they fought in the battle of Maryang San, described by the official historian of Australia’s involvement, Professor Robert O’Neill, as Australia’s finest feat of arms in the Korean War.
Korean War legacies for Australia
First, Australia’s prompt contribution of air and land forces and naval assets to the US-led counter-offensive under General MacArthur proved to be a significant turning point. Until then, the United States had been unwilling to engage with Australia in the formulation of a mutual security treaty. Thereafter, the United States took a different approach, welcoming the signing of the ANZUS Treaty. The Australian External Affairs Minister at the time, Percy Spender, deserves credit for ensuring Australia’s contribution was made early and prominently.
Second, the experience of working with the United States under a United Nations mandate helped consolidate the place and standing of the United Nations at a time when the world was polarised between the so-called First World, aligned with the United States, and the Second World of Communist countries – as the two sought to compete against each other over parts of the so-called Third World. The legacy of the failed inter-war League of Nations had left many concerned that the United Nations would be stillborn. The Korean War demonstrated that, under the right circumstances, the United Nations could act decisively.
Third, Australia’s participation in the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) from 1956 onwards, and its contribution of forces to the Vietnam War from 1962 onwards, were further manifestations of the mindset evident in the Korean War. That is, Australia would seek to bolster security institutions and arrangements that were linked with the United States and which helped encourage the United States to remain engaged in Australia’s neighbourhood. This was widely understood by Australian government officials as being the best and most economical way of bolstering the stability and security, and in turn the prosperity, of Australia and its neighbourhood.
Fourth, the Australian armed services, now known as the Australian Defence Force (ADF), have come to place considerable emphasis on the benefits that accrue from close engagement with their US and other close counterparts. Experience in working intimately alongside them has helped to hone the ADF and to ensure access to the latest and best military technology. That has been seen as crucial for a small, boutique, or compact, ADF, with niche but highly capable forces able to deploy rapidly and confidently, near or far.
That approach has been largely maintained by successive Australian governments in recent years, with Australia seeking to make a substantive military contribution to military campaigns in Afghanistan, then Iraq, then Afghanistan again and then Iraq again. This has been in part at least intended to burnish Australia’s credentials with the United States, while being mindful of the need to address transnational security concerns emanating from the Middle East that have a spill-over effect in Australia and its neighbourhood. To an extent, this engagement has come at a cost to Australia’s ability to engage constructively and consistently with its regional security partners. The situation in the Middle East will undoubtedly continue to fester, but closer to home, significant security challenges have arisen in places like Marawi in the Philippines which serve to remind the ADF to focus on relationships and capabilities required closer to home.
Looking ahead
In 2018, however, there is a strange sense of déjà vu when it comes to the prospect of war on the Korean peninsula. While no one expects any outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula to resemble the Korean War of 1950–53, Australia remains under obligations as a party to the UN Command and the ceasefire arrangements. Australia today has become the United States’ closest and most trusted ally in the Indo-Pacific region. The ties are broad, deep and strong. Australian forces are more compatible and inter-operable with their American counterparts than ever before. Indeed, Australian forces now conduct military exercises alongside American and South Korean counterparts. These factors, combined, suggest that should a conflict arise on the Korean peninsula, then the lessons of Australia’s experience in Korea from 65 years ago may well turn out to be important for our armed forces today.