A challenging legacy: memories of the First World War in Germany

The First World War was for a long time a forgotten war in Germany. In the collective memory of most Germans, the recollections of the First World War were replaced with those of the Second World War and the crimes committed by Germans between 1939 and 1945. There was no great public interest in the centenary of the great seminal catastrophe of the 20th century. In contrast, the remembrance of the Great War or Grande Guerre constitutes an eminent feature of public life and political affairs in France and Great Britain that is highlighted in the ceremonies commemorating the armistice on 11 November 1918. The multitudes of recent publications on the First World War and the media coverage of the topic show that many people in Germany have meanwhile again become interested in the First World War and particularly in the “war-guilt” issue.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure for me as a German who has travelled almost around the entire globe to come here and have the opportunity to speak to you on a topic which in this year, in particular, has achieved a relevance that just a few years ago would have been impossible for me to imagine. The study of the origins, course and results of the First World War also from a German perspective has become one of the main topics my staff and I have addressed, explored and discussed literally on all continents. The First World War indeed seems to be a challenging legacy. Even after 100 years, its reappraisal is still exciting and productive.

The First World War in post-war reception after 1918

Let me begin with the year 1918. For Germany, the end of the First World War meant not only the loss of its position as a great power and of its colonial empire. It also brought to light the serious social distortions which had been in the offing years before but were successfully covered up in times of peace. After the end of the war, they inevitably caused the collapse of the monarchy. Admittedly, the formal transition into a parliamentary monarchy had been successfully completed during the war, but the circumstance brought about revolution and reorganization. The elites who had been the pillars of the system responded to the inevitable loss with some kind of dual refusal. On the one hand, they refused to accept the reality of defeat and the introduction of democracy and parliamentarism which they perceived as "alienation" and "de-Germanization". The Entente forces did not perceive the Weimar coalition as a political factor that gave rise to ideas of compensation and international cooperation, especially at the end of the war, but as representative of a state oriented towards aggressive expansion. Moreover, since 1917 the socialist forces in Germany had failed to hold a dialog across trenches and borders so that is was fair to speak about a national camp mentality in Germany. Accordingly, the German social democracy responded quite sharply to the war-guilt clause 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. According to the future Reich President, Friedrich Ebert, they had wanted to reclaim a "Wilson's Peace" and "not let themselves bullied by the Ententists". (Niethard, Kriegsende und Friedensordnung, p. 181). As a result, the debate over the Treaty and the heavy burdens included in it threw the German society into long-lasting conflict overshadowing any possible new beginning. The blame was not put on those who instigated and planned the war but on those who had doubts about a victorious peace and early on offered negotiations to end the war. Misjudging the real situation, the former were of the opinion that the German Army had remained undefeated in the field. In 1919, General Field Marshal Mackensen got to the heart of the matter:

"Not the troops of the Entente but Germany's worst enemy, its own people, in its unique character brought about the collapse. And now, this people continues to rage at German flesh and blood in the cities... Prussian militarism educated, the social democratic "freedom" corrupts the people (quote in ibid, p. 182)

Mackensen thus put forward the leitmotif of the stab-in-the-back legend, an image that over the years served especially right-wing opponents of the young and unstable Weimar democracy as a means to play off the different political camps against each other and to eventually undermine the despised democratic system. To top it all, in his welcoming address to the troops returning from the field, Ebert himself declared: "No enemy has vanquished you." The fight against the so-called war-guilt lie, the reinterpretation of the defeat as stab in the back of the bravely fighting army and the revision concept against Versailles provided the basic attitude of a German policy of transition into the 1920s. The compromise of Weimar agreed by the political camps in Germany was shaky, and the right wing proceeded on the assumption that it was an interim solution that had to be overcome as soon as possible. For the remaining elites, accepting the defeat was out of the question. Among elite circles, the war itself - and this is part of its reception - was stylized as the frontline experience per se, and endowed with pathos. The extreme right wing added the glorification of being a frontline soldier (Frontkämpfertum) which characterized, in particular, the many military alliances in the Weimar Republic. German memory in the immediate post-war period was thus characterized by two motives: revenge and repression.   

The First World War and its importance in the academic context of yesterday and today.

I will now examine the academic reception regarding this difficult legacy of the First World War as it took place in Germany and Europe on the cusp of the 21st century.

July 2014 marked the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. Whereas in Belgium, France, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Austria the Great War or Grande Guerre is commemorated with considerable expense and attracts great interest from the media and the public, the approaching anniversary does not meet with the same a response in Germany as in the above-mentioned states. In contrast, the discussion in Germany appears rather restraint. Meanwhile, important events take place and especially the museum landscape of the relevant museums faces this topic with impressive special exhibitions. The question, however, of whether the course and impact of this event of the century pull at the heartstrings of the Germans can be answered in the negative. A wide social discussion about the First World War with active participation of members of the government as in other Western European states? No chance in Germany! Nevertheless, - and this should be emphasized - the Federal President observed a day of remembrance of the First World War at his official seat in Berlin in an elaborate and impressive way in the middle of the year, which, in my opinion, set standards. How to explain the differences in dealing with the "seminal catastrophe of the 20th century"?

In order to provide an adequate answer to this question about the differences in the perception of this event, it is necessary to take a look at the context - and this also includes Germany's neighbors. The main objective is to study the beginning and end, as well as the causes and consequences of the First World War more thoroughly. While today in many parts of Germany, 11 November at 11.11 a.m. is celebrated noisily and with joy as the beginning of carnival, for many British citizens this is the day to quietly commemorate their soldiers who had been killed in action. As an outward sign, they attach a poppy to their clothing. This tradition goes back to the poem "In Flanders Fields" by John McCrae from Canada, in which he describes the red poppies on the battlefields of Flanders and Northern France. The red color of the poppy is also a symbol for the blood of the fallen soldiers. Although nowadays, on "Remembrance Day", Great Britain commemorates British soldiers killed in all wars, the day - originally called “Armistice Day” - dates back to the end of the First World War, since never before and after had Great Britain suffered greater losses in a war than in the "Great War". In addition to the commemoration of soldiers killed in action, this is also a day of expressing pride in their own soldiers.[2] In France, the “Armistice Day” is an official holiday of great social importance - as a day to commemorate the soldiers killed in action. Up to the present, 11 November continues to be deeply anchored in the commemoration culture of both states, as well as of other former Entente states to commemorate the glorious victory over Germany. Deep in their hearts, many French people regard the "Grande Guerre" as a war which bleed their country but in contrast to the ignominy of the Second World War it was not associated with defeat and the occupation of Paris by German troops. French attempts, for instance by President Sarkozy in his day, to declare 11 November as the “Day of Franco-German Friendship” and to celebrate this day together with Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Arc de Triomphe did not only not meet with approval but met with resistance instead.[3]

Australians and New Zealanders commemorate their fallen troops on “Anzac Day”. This day commemorates the battles of Australian and New Zealand units on the Turkish peninsula of Gallipoli in 1915, it is marked on the day of the landing, on 25 April of each year. Up into the present, Australia commemorates not only those killed in action on that day, it also conducts a military parade to remember the victory over the central powers. But you know this better than I do, there is no need to mention it here. What is important, however, is the fact that in the commemoration of the Australians, the First World War as "blood sacrifice" holds a key position as founding myth of the modern Australian society and its army. In foreign policy, the “Anzac spirit” represents the fact that during the Great War Australia had acted for the first time as a unified nation and a sovereign player on the international stage. In domestic policy, national integration was facilitated by the "all-Australian community of suffering" during the war years. On the one hand, the examples mentioned do illustrate the dramatic political changes triggered by the First World War all over the world which even nowadays still have a positive connotation in many states. On the other hand, despite the resistance of some national peace movements, military successes of great-grandfathers are still celebrated as military victories and serve as traditions for present-day military personnel. Against this background, it is not surprising that - as far as I know - the Australian government provides more than 80 million dollars for the commemoration festivities from 2014 to 2018.

Commemoration in Germany

In Germany, on the contrary, the way in which the former Entente states deal with 11 November, in particular, and the First World War in general is met with incomprehension. For many Germans, the idea of celebrating a military victory - and especially in the context of commemorating the dead - is just as incomprehensible as the idea of publicly demonstrating pride for their own military personnel. Such a tradition has not developed in Germany. The unique German way of dealing with military successes and the commemoration of military personnel killed in action - compared to other states which had participated in the First World War - becomes obvious from German history in the "era of world wars".

During the Weimar Republic and the "Third Reich", it was inconceivable to commemorate the signing of the Armistice which most Germans regarded as an admission of defeat. In the 1920s, only very few Germans would have found something positive in the defeat because of the reasons mentioned above. On the contrary, the Treaty of Versailles, which in Article 231 made Germany and its allies responsible for the outbreak of the war, was rejected by many Germans as a dictate of shame. In Germany, therefore, the end of the First World War did not have a positive or meaningful connotation after the war. 11 November disappeared from the society's horizon of perception as a consequence of the Second World War as did in this context the defeat of 1918 as a historical event. Nowadays, Germany not only commemorates the military personnel killed in both world wars but also the "dead of two world wars at the fronts and at home" and the "victims of tyranny of all nations" on the National Day of Mourning on the last Sunday of the church year in November. Any kind of heroic pathos is deliberately avoided in order to make it clear that there is no connection to the Day of Commemoration of Heroes (Heldengedenktag) of the National Socialists. In this context, the First World War disappears in the shadows of the Second World War. At the same time, commemoration is extended to include the civilian victims of tyranny - and thus civilized and internationalized - which is in contrast to many other European states. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the National Day of Mourning, which was introduced in the 1920s, as were the memorial days in France or Great Britain, to commemorate the German military personnel killed in the First World War, no longer has a deliberate connection to the First World War. And by no means is this memorial day used to proudly point out the military achievements of German military personnel of the past and the present.

Last but not least, this is due to fact that in the collective memory of the Germans the recollection of the First World War is overshadowed by the Second World War and the German crimes committed in the years between 1939 and 1945. Given the horrors of the Second World War and its consequences, neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic had much interest in reappraising the history of the First World War in the post-1945 era. 

Merely in the early 1960s did the First World War for a short time break the shadow of the Second World War with a sensational bang when in 1961 Fritz Fischer's book „Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/1918“ [4] - which was published in English in 1967 entitled "Germany's Aims in the First World War"- triggered a fierce debate about the German past before the National Socialists' grab for power that went far beyond the small circle of experts. Fischer did not just provide an analysis of the German war aims in the First World War, rather he placed considerable responsibility on Germany for triggering the seminal catastrophe of the 20th century. This resulted in a journalistic earthquake and a previously unknown discussion in the West German historical science community which also extended to large parts of the German public. The debate about the German war guilt, which had been conducted in a highly politicized atmosphere in the years after the Peace Treaty of Versailles, was reignited. Konrad Jarausch cuts right to the chase of the matter: "Fischer’s theses were shocking. Adolf Eichmann was on trial in Jerusalem, the Auschwitz trials began in Frankfurt. All Germans were made aware of the terrible things that had happened in the Third Reich. And now, they were also blamed for the First World War.“ [5]

The Fischer controversy about the issue of the German Empire's guilt in the First World War, that was to last into the late 1970s, took its course. In his book „Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914“, published in English in 1975 as “War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914”, Fischer goes even further by accusing the leadership of the German Empire of having made long-term war plans to achieve German hegemony in Europe. The ordinary from Hamburg thus not only refuted the thesis of the fateful involvement resulting in the war, he replaced it with the cool calculating act of the imperial leadership instead. Fischer's academic opponents, like Egmont Zechlin, Karl Dietrich Erdmann and Gerhard Ritter, criticized his theses in the strongest terms. They accused him of placing the sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war on Germany and drawing an unjustified line of continuity in German history from Frederick II via Bismarck to Adolf Hitler.

All participants in the debate went beyond the academic dispute and almost reached the limits of personal defamation. This was not least due to the fact that the discussion about Fischer's theses immediately extended into a debate about the continuity of the German war aims policy from Emperor Wilhelm II. to Adolf Hitler, and mass media like the "Spiegel" sided with Fischer in articles like: „Fischer [...] demonstrates that the German Empire [...] had the urge for territorial expansion which appears to have been even more exorbitant than the "people without space" complex of the National Socialists. [...] The imperial travelers to eastern lands had hardly less appetite than the future swastika-crusaders" [7]. In next to no time, large circles of the German public embarked on a discussion which hitherto had been conducted among professional historians. Even leading West German politicians, like Federal Chancellor Ludwig Ehrhard or Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier, spoke publicly against Fischer, accusing him of damaging the reputation of the young Federal Republic and eventually obstructing the rebuilding of Germany. [8]. Even though over the next few years moderate opponents of Fischer acknowledged at least parts of his position, namely that the German imperial leadership had deliberately taken a war into account, the disputing camps continued to be irreconcilable in many respects for a long time. Two doctrines evolved over the years. On the one hand, the uncompromising advocates of a planned war which the German imperial leadership had deliberately brought about, and on the other hand representatives of the thesis that the main responsibility for the outbreak of the war lay in Berlin but that there had been no systematic long-term preparations for the war.

While the German historical science community continued to have lively discussions about the question of whether the German Empire was responsible for the First World War, politicians and public lost interest in this topic after a few years. For many, the fascination regarding this discussion did not lie in dealing with the outbreak of the First World War but with the special path of Germany and the determined German grab for world power culminating in National Socialism and the outrageous crimes of Germans during the Second World War.

For many years, the interest in the causes for the "seminal catastrophe" remained unabated.

Fifty years after the beginning of the "Fischer controversy" and a few months before the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the war in 2014, changes in the perception of the First World War can be seen in various aspects. In Germany, new insights regarding the outbreak of the war in 1914 have meanwhile been introduced in history textbooks for schools albeit with the delay typical for schoolbooks. The "innocence thesis" - which had been commonly spread throughout the 1950s and 1960s - is "history". The outbreak of the war is depicted as a complex process. [9] In German history textbooks, however, the First World War does not take up as much space as in Great Britain, France or Australia. In the last decades, the First World War has rarely been mentioned in the German public or media, and whenever this had been the case then it was with reference to the Second World War. One example is the Spiegel Special "Die Ur-Katastrophe des 20. Jahrhunderts" (The Seminal Catastrophe of the 20th century). It was published ninety years after the outbreak of the war, in 2004. Not only its subtitle "The First World War and its consequences" but also the pictures of Emperor Wilhelm II and of Adolf Hitler on the cover page presented the line of continuity from the First to the Second World War. [10]

Germany and the Anniversary in 2014

Against this background, it is no surprise that the official Germany struggles with the observation of this centennial. Whereas many former Entente states have begun the preparations for the celebration of the world war anniversary many years ago, the Federal government has tried to keep a low profile regarding this centennial and practiced official restraint since for Germany - as the loser of the war - a "meaningful interpretation" like in the victorious states is not easily possible. [11]. For many Germans, a meaningful event in 2014 is the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the peaceful German revolution. Outside of Germany, the way Germany handled active politics of memory was met with incomprehension. Not everyone in the victorious states approved unconditionally the efforts of the German Foreign Office in the commemoration festivities to avoid pointing out who had won the war and instead focus on the joint commemoration of the more than 15 million dead of the First World War and "endow them with meaning" for European integration. In Great Britain, the number of people wanting to celebrate the victory over Germany should not be underestimated. In this respect, British historian Hew Strachan explained “many people fought believing it was worthwhile." We have to accept this motivation”. [11] With this statement he pleasantly sets himself apart from Michael Gove: He, the British Secretary of State for Education after all, declared that the "Great War" was a just war against the "ruthless social Darwinism of the German elites, the pitiless approach they took to occupation, their aggressively expansionist war aims and their scorn for the international order." [12] Even though these statements met with much criticism in Great Britain, it shows the difficult terrain for German politics of memory concerning the First World War.

In Germany, the many media and historians, including Gerd Krumeich, criticized the restraint of the federal government as disinterest and "foolishness". [11] Meanwhile, the new federal government has given up some of this official restraint. The Federal President attended the celebrations in France and Belgium in the summer. With his book "Sleepwalkers", Australian historian Christopher Clark proved that the First World War and, in particular, the outbreak of the war in 1914 still moves people also in Germany. [13] For weeks, it was on the top of the bestseller lists. One of the reasons for the success of this book is that although Clark does not “exonerate” Germany from the outbreak of the war, he points out in his controversially discussed volume that before the war Germany was no more aggressive than the other European great powers. The war had been a joint European "fruit" [14].

With "Sleepwalkers" Clark rekindled a discussion about the responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War almost 50 years after Fischer which had long been conducted in the international historical science community but been unnoticed by the German public and which has increasingly shifted the focus away from Germany towards Austria-Hungary and other individual Entente states.

In his new book “Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914-1918” (The Great War. The World 1914-1918) which some reviewers had praised as a masterpiece [15], Herfried Münkler, the political scientist from Berlin, contradicted the thesis of German war guilt. [16]. This pointed statement, of course, did not remain without contradiction. In addition to Gerd Krumeich, other historians, like Michael Epkenhans, criticized the theses of Clark and Münkler. According to Epkenhans, Berlin and Vienna had set the course for war in 1914. [17] As in the Fischer controversy, the media took up the discussion: In his article ”Nun schlittern sie wieder. Mit Clark gegen Fischer: Deutschlands Konservative sehen Kaiser und Reich in der Kriegsschuldfrage endlich rehabilitiert“, published in Die Zeit of 24 January 2014, Volker Ulrich established a direct link between the current discussion and the Fischer controversy. According to him, more recent works do not contain new sources which refute Fischer's theses. Nevertheless, according to Ulrich, Fischer's abuse continues as in the 1960s. German conservatives are trying to regain the prerogative of interpretation of German history by setting the course in historical policy. Attempts were made to discredit the critics of Clark and Münkler who continued to place the [VR1] main responsibility on Germany with the term schuldstolz (pride of guilt). With slight resignation Ulrich concludes: “It is conspicuous how dull resistance has been so far. It seems the professionals have tired of the discussion.“ [18] This statement also referred to the manifest “Warum Deutschland nicht allein schuld ist“ (Why Germany is not the only one to blame) by Dominik Geppert, Sönke Neitzel, Cora Stephan and Thomas Weber, published in the newspaper Die Welt on 4 January 2014, where they also state that the war-guilt issue nowadays no longer plays an important role. [19].

Not least thanks to Clark's “Sleepwalkers”, the centennial of the outbreak of the First World War in 2014 has reached German politics and society. The media have taken up the topic. Television programs and journal articles deal with this topic. Many books on the First World War have been published or are forthcoming over the next months, in addition, a number of cultural events and historical specialist conferences have been planned. 

The consequences of the First World War have also caught up with the German government. It is impossible to avoid an all-European remembrance of the First World War. We will have to return to this issue later. The current crisis over Ukraine, which as independent state under German dominance entered the world stage for the first time as a consequence of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, shows that great power politics continue to be a common feature even in the 21st century and the importance of clever diplomacy in crisis situations. In his introductory speech at the event "Vom Versagen und Nutzen der Diplomatie" (Of failure and benefit of diplomacy) hosted by the German Foreign Office, the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, cautioned given the failure of diplomacy during the July crisis of 1914 with a view to the situation in Ukraine “what happens when there are no efforts to talk”. With a view to the current Crimea crisis, the question of war and peace has returned to Europe and “is sending chills up and down his spine”. [14]

It seems that the wish expressed by Kurt Kister, Chief Editor of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, a renowned newspaper in Germany, in January 2014 to finally consider the First World War "on its own" after 100 years have passed, has been too optimistic in view of the current developments despite all justified rejection of historical parallels. [20]

Commemoration in a European perspective

Allow me to take a look at the future of commemoration beyond the conditions in Germany. In a certain way, this perspective is still up in the air, however, it would offer a possible way to further develop the culture of commemoration. It also must include a European reference. Not only tradition but also commemorative cultures are changing. If we take a look on Europe as a whole, it might occur to us to think about a convergence of a European historical narrative and thus a connecting commemorative culture. It will not happen, of course, that France, Britain, the Netherlands and others merge their national commemorative cultures completely with a European perspective; and this is no less true for Germany as well. I have already explained the resistance to this idea earlier. It is noticeable that for years it has been custom to also invite the Germans to join important commemorative events in other countries. This is not only true for the First World War. Furthermore, one should not forget that future generations will insist on developing their own forms of remembrance. Acquiring such a comprehensive perspective with regard to the commemoration of a jointly experienced history has become a reality not least for military personnel of European armies, because over the last 25 years they have stood side by side in international missions in times of peace, crisis and war. Since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and a European Security Strategy adopted in 2003, the need to pool military forces has brought home to the national states of Europe that it was necessary to cooperate not only in long-term defense projects but also to set up many multinational European units and thus successfully contribute to security and stability in and for Europe. In the future, a Europe that is growing together and agrees on issues of its security policy and most other policy areas to pursue common objectives will rely on multinational operations as a rule. We cannot but understand that Europe has become a region of fate and its peoples a community of fate.[1] This has always been the case, by the way.

The common task of peacekeeping requires even today a mutual understanding of the common history without any glorifying myths and hampering positing. Furthermore, it is necessary to openly name the painful experiences of European history, to communicate with each other about them, to continue to remember them, to commemorate the people who lost their lives and to suppress nothing. This is not easy, it requires complex education efforts, a permanent change of perspective as a methodical approach to start this process with the most possible success. In this context, the German historian Klaus Schönhoven declared with a view to a culture of memory: “As you know, there are positive and negative memories of certain events and periods of history, often there are no common but profoundly different memories because the generations of the participants and those affected had faced each other as enemies or had been divided from each other as perpetrators and victims. Such boundaries and dividing lines cannot be removed either with a symbolic gesture of reconciliation nor with relativizations and equalizations motivated by politics of history. A common memory can only develop if enmities, conflicts and catastrophes of the past are included. There are always the own memories. And there are always the memories of the others. A discussion of the differences can be the beginning of rapprochement.”[2]

Further debate of common history will only be successful if people are prepared to deal with the dark chapters of their own history collectively and without reservation. In doing so, this social process can become the litmus test for the quality and maturity of democratic societies and states. As a result of a process of self-assurance in this context, the national horizon of experience and action can be abandoned in favor of a transnational interpretation of history.

Looking at Europe today, one has to realize that it indeed seems to be historical patchwork. Therefore, it is difficult to refer to a European commemorative culture. One might justly ask: What could be the basis on which a common memory could be built?

European history is - in the perception of some - a history of long duration and ultimately aims for unity - either voluntarily or by force. Indeed, there are some crown witnesses to confirm this, ranging from Charlemagne via Charles V to Napoleon I and others. If something noble can be derived from European history it is also necessary to mention the cruelties of this history: the wars, the Holocaust, genocides, ethnic cleansing, displacements, state crimes in the course of decolonization and many other things.

Is it at all possible to have a uniform view of history of Europeans which they could declare as the basis of an identity of whatever kind? Probably not, the differences between the individual histories, experiences and discourse are too great. What could be possible, however, is a conquest of purely national patterns of thought and identification allowing the basically different experience to become part of one’s own experience, a mentality facilitating transnational thinking and acting.

Under the influence of European integration, Europe, indeed, does possess a common peaceful and value-based history. The common experience of European states with democratic structures, however, is still young. It starts in 1945 for the western part of Europe, and in 1989 for the eastern part. This joint time could be the foundation for a common awareness in the future. What gives rise to optimism is the fact that the appeal of the European idea seems unabated. With the inclusion of Germany in the middle of the continent, the Europeans will only be able to act if they act jointly.

What could be common topics to define a European culture of remembrance? The great wars of the continent have a lasting importance for the collective memory of the European peoples, but in different ways according to national significance. The have manifested themselves in different ways and established a physical representation in sites of remembrance. It certainly makes sense to visit these places and to discuss the different stories told about these places. Be it Verdun, Kobarid (the former Karfeit) or the Atlantic coastline - these are places of European significance. They include in a particular manner Holocaust sites and locations and places of remembrance dedicated to displace­ment and ethnic cleansing. In the commemorative culture of Germany, I have increasingly observed efforts on a local level to take up the history of the "ordinary guy" in the world war. Such a perspective allows to shift the view from the great theaters of war and personages to the life, suffering and dying of the ordinary people in the world wars. Such approach to the history of memory is shared abroad. Belgium, in particular, takes a similar approach: there is no village, no small town that does not try to tell and stage a history of the people in their place during the world war. Could this be a starting point for joint commemoration?

Year dates can mark reference points. The resulting memorial days, or more broadly the days of remembrance, have engrained themselves into the memory of European peoples. With regard to 1 September 1939, Poles and Germans have different feelings. In contrast, 8 May 1945 is perceived as a day of liberation in Europe. It is the starting point for reconciliation which especially includes the immediate neighboring peoples of Germany. From the very beginning, Franco-German or German-Polish reconciliation efforts have attempted on the one hand not to let the events be forgotten and on the other hand to make tangible the consequences of the war that continue to have an impact to this day. In the meantime, the Franco-German reconciliation immediately after the war is a concept which in turn has been historicized. What matters now, is to teach future generations this successful process of coming to terms with the past because it is part of our common history.

Ladies and gentlemen, Germany is thoroughly engaging in studying and remembering the First World War. It is important to point out that the Germans gradually understand the relevance of the First World War to them and how much its results continue to have an impact. In the historical science community, we have proceeded to examine the period from 1914 to 1945 together, calling it "era of world wars". For a continued

peaceful and liberal development in Europe it is absolutely necessary to obtain a transnational historical perspective. This could be the basis for the development of a commemorative culture that converges in many points which could bring the peoples of Europe closer together.

I thank you for your attention.