Neil Jackson Rankin as a Sergeant D Coy 6 RAR interviewed by Greg Swanborough for 'The sharp end'

Sergeant D Coy, 6RAR 2 June 1966 to 14 June 1967. Scene 19, Take 1: Contact with enemy at Long Tan. 11 Platoon came across a large group of Vietcong and flanked them by surprise. Take 2: Describes track systems and order of the Company ‘arrowhead’ formation and placements for engagement. Initial reaction when Vietcong did to see our troops; in total contact with three to five Vietcong groups, their initial reaction was to break contact. Tells why Vietcong stayed to fight this time. Take 3: Describes the advance and being repelled into the air. Platoon commander Geoff Kendall thought ‘they’d been blown to smithereens!” Describes the shock and bewilderment - -difficult with conditions in the face of masses of enemy (three to four hundred in front). Take 4, roll 41: Intensity of artillery fire. It was close because of closeness of enemy. Sound of whistling a deafening noise. He talks about the differences between armaments of the opposing forces. There were problems with weapons in the mud, rain and low supply of ammunition. Talks about 10 Platoon diverting fire from 11 Platoon, allowing a safe withdrawal. Armoured Personnel (APC) relief column at first appeared to turn away but then returned in their direction – a big relief! On the 19th August returned to battlefield to recover the dead and wounded. Describes clean up operation at Long Tan and the emotion of seeing the 11 Platoon comrades and empty beds of those who would not return. Take 5 [retake of 4]. Take 6 [retake of 4]. Description of burial of Vietcong. Two survivors are handed over to Intelligence Office at Battalion level. Take 7: Radio communications initially good then it deteriorated. Talks about the National Servicemen and Regular soldiers. The attitude of the soldiers was good and there was no difference in their ability. Take 8: Explains why there were so few Australian casualties despite the enemy’s superior numbers; the day before Long Tan, the enemy had observed B Company that had a strength of about thirty to forty in total. After initial contact with 11 Platoon on the 18th August 1966 the enemy realised they’d been detected and went in to annihilate them thinking it was B Company. They actually engaged with 10 Platoon and were repelled, then with 12 Platoon and again repelled. There was confusion on both sides. The Vietcong had observed one small force but encountered three. Take 9, roll 42: Patrols in the months prior to Long Tan were quicker and more relaxed. Contact with the enemy was fleeting. After Long Tan patrols were more alert, wary and cautious. The troops were all a bit jumpy. Take 10: Clearing the area around the camp was boring. There were occasional sightings of the enemy and no exchanges of fire. Later, patrols slowed as they became more aware of the enemy’s strength, tactics and booby traps. The initial training was put into practise against the enemy. The most difficult task was removing the dead after they’d travelled about three thousand meters in the back of an APC. They had been placed in there with dignity but the rough terrain had jumbled them up. It was very difficult unloading the bodies. They were sent to the hospital morgue then shipped home in coffins.