The Western Wolfpack Guerrillas: An Australian Navy vessel cooperated with Korean exiles in a successful assault

Operation Roundup was a combined naval, air and ground operation that took place off the west coast of Korea in 1952 during the Korean War. The Australian destroyer HMAS Bataan was the headquarters for the operation and also provided naval gunfire support for the ground forces. The Reports of proceedings for the Bataan describe this operation as a great example of United Nations inter-service cooperation. The records particularly noted the “excellent intelligence obtained by the Western Wolfpack guerrillas’ agents prior to the raid” which enabled close fire support from the Bataan supported by sorties flown from the carrier Ocean.

The Western Wolfpack guerrillas were bands of exiled anti-communists from North Korea, who had established garrisons on several of the offshore islands in the Haeju Gulf on Korea’s rugged west coast, just north of the 38th Parallel. In April and May 1952 the land along the coast was in the hands of the North Korean army. The war in this area had settled into a pattern of harassment, with the guerrillas stationed on the islands carrying out night raids on the mainland. Their aim was to pin down large numbers of the North Korean forces and divert them from the front lines. 

During its tour in 1952, HMAS Bataan regularly patrolled the Haeju Gulf area and was in contact with the island inhabitants. Throughout April 1952 the Bataan assisted the guerrillas in several operations. In mid-April, during low tide on the island of Yongmae Do, the North Koreans began to cross from the mainland by foot over the mudflats to attack the guerrillas.  The Wolfpacks garrisoned on Yongmae Do observed this and called to the Bataan for assistance. The Bataan fired on enemy positions and successfully used a creeping barrage to support the guerrillas in pushing back the North Korean forces. Mr Lee, an English-speaking South Korean, was the Wolfpack leader on Yongmae Do, keeping the Bataan informed of map coordinates, enemy advances and positions. 

Plans for Operation Roundup began on the island of Yong Pyong Do. On 15 May, Warwick Seymour Bracegirdle, commander of the Bataan, went ashore on the island to meet the Wolfpack leaders and inspect installations. The guerrillas sought Bracegirdle’s support for a plan to attack the mainland and push the North Koreans back from a communist-held mainland peninsula, Ponggu-yon. Local intelligence had revealed that Ponggu-yon was held by at least two battalions of North Korean and Chinese troops, supported by artillery. If the plan succeeded, it would provide greater security for the islands and the guerrillas who occupied them. Bracegirdle could see the advantages, and offered the guerrillas his support for the operation.

The island of Yong Pyong Do lies 10 kilometres off Ponggu-yon. Many North Korean refugees were living on the island, struggling to survive and eking out a meagre existence from the land. The place was denuded of trees, which had been cut down for fires, and the refugees dug for shellfish along the shore. On Yong Pyong Do an American, Captain George Lamm, was head of the guerrillas. His plan was to land ground forces, consisting of 420 guerrillas, on the mainland in a bold daylight raid. The aim of the operation was to bring the enemy to battle and thus expose them to maximum naval artillery fire. There was a risk: the guerrilla forces had to land with sufficient stealth so as not to alert the enemy and give them time to increase their defences. Plans were finalised on 17 May and Bracegirdle took overall command, running the operation from the Bataan. He requested air fire support from the aircraft carrier HMS Ocean.

The 1952 Reports of proceedings for the HMAS Bataan include a detailed account of the progress of the operation that began on the morning of 19 May. HMAS Bataan began the operation at 9.52 am when, anchored in a position east of the island Mu-Do,  it open fired on the mainland beachhead to detonate any land mines and push the enemy forces back from the beach. A preliminary assault force (Blue force) sailed from the island of Yuk-To to the mainland in junks to seize and hold the beach and safeguard it as the evacuation point. The guerrillas used locally sourced sail junks to tow in powered junks that were later to be used for a faster evacuation.

The main attack, staged from the small island of Cho Do, was subdivided into three forces: Red, Green and Yellow, which were transported in junks to the mainland. After landing they negotiated the antipersonnel mine field and fanned out to seal the peninsula. During this time the Bataan received various calls for fire from the three forces, and laid down bombardments with help from the men in the field in spotting the fall of fire.

The raid was carried out between 9.40 am and 5.20 pm. During this time the Red, Green and Yellow forces swept towards the Blue force, supported by naval and air fire power. The main counter-attack was neutralised by the Bataan’s gunfire. The forces were able to move rapidly towards the tip of the peninsula, where Blue force had secured the beach for evacuation. Blue force created a defensive perimeter and the junk embarkation was carried out successfully. Ten families who had been supporting the guerrillas before the operation were also evacuated at their request.

The overall operation was regarded as a success, with 150 of the enemy and only one Wolfpack Guerrilla killed. The North Koreans’ headquarters, command post, artillery and installations that had dominated the beach area were completely destroyed. The Bataan continued to operate in the Gulf and to protect the guerrillas’ islands until the end of its tour. However, the Reports of proceedings note that the guerrillas devoted more time than had been intended to rounding up cattle, which were brought into the evacuation area and transported in junks back to the guerrilla-held territory on the islands. One of the aims of the operation had been for the guerrillas to take prisoners for intelligence, but it was noted that this aspect of the operation failed, with only one Chinese communist prisoner being taken.

The operation, though modest in size, was daring and complex in its coordinated use of air, land and sea. The process of the battle was plotted and recorded from the Bataan’s bridge, including gunnery and air targets. The focal point of the command system on Bataan was centred around a large scale operational map which had been set up on the ship’s bridge.

Several official honours were awarded for the operation. Bracegirdle was awarded a second bar to his Distinguished Service Cross for this operation, as well as for his leadership throughout Bataan’s second tour of duty in Korean waters. The Wolfpacks presented the ship with a “communist calf” which, according to the records, was accepted and hoisted aboard on the torpedo davits. The Wolfpack commander, Captain Lamm, with two US army officers were the last to leave the mainland. They were given a “warrior’s welcome on board – a double tot of rum served on the bridge on a silver salver. The communist calf was given a drink of water” and was later discreetly released.

First published in Wartime Issue 56, October 2011. Image P06007.001 has been added to the originally published article.