El Alamein 80 years on

Some eighty years ago Australians played a prominent and important part in one of the Second World War’s key battles, El Alamein. In the secondary North African theatre, it was but one of several turning points  in the war’s middle year, 1942. In a global war it was unlikely there would ever be just one momentous shift in tide; the latter half of the year saw Allied victories at Midway, Guadalcanal, Milne Bay and Kokoda. The greatest was of course Stalingrad. But such events rarely turn ‘on a dime’: most play out over several days or longer. Such was the case with El Alamein. Fighting on the Alamein line actually played out over four months from July to November and the decisive battle saw twelve days of intense combat.

When the Second World War began there were already Italian and British forces in North Africa. The Italians had an army in their colony (today’s Libya), the British in Egypt. After the fall of France and Dunkirk, in June 1940 the Italians declared war on Britain. A few days later the clashes began across the Libyan–Egyptian frontier. The Italians were looking to kick the British out of Egypt, with a view to expanding their empire in North Africa. The British needed to hold Egypt to retain control of the Suez Canal, protect oil supply in the Middle East, and control the eastern Mediterranean. The region was a key part of Britain’s war strategy.

After a half-hearted Italian invasion of Egypt in September 1940, the British struck back and rapidly pushed the Italians west, all the way back to Tripolitania. Needing to prop up his failing ally, Hitler despatched a German force to help that would become famously known as the Africa Corps. Led by the headstrong and daring Erwin Rommel, the Axis forces launched a counter-offensive that sent the British and Commonwealth troops headlong east, back to Egypt. The Australian 9th Division held out during the Siege of Tobruk until the next Allied offensive relieved them in late 1941. And so back and forth over vast distances went the North African Campaign, now for the fourth time since the beginning.

Logistics

A major challenge in North Africa was always logistics – the provision of supplies to the forces in theatre. From the main Axis supply base at Tripoli (today’s western Libya) to Alexandria, the main Allied base in Egypt, was over 1,500 kilometres as the crow flies. By road it was closer to 1,800 kilometres – farther than Warsaw to Stalingrad. The problem remained that whichever side made great advances across the desert, they would inevitably get further away from their base of supply, while the army in retreat would come closer to theirs.

Port capacity was a key issue; over the vast distance between Tripoli and Alexandria there were only a few ports with very limited capacity to unload supplies to be sent forward. These ports were under constant air attack. Libya and Egypt’s Western Desert were also quite sparsely populated and much of the terrain barren. Armies therefore could not really live off the land. Most essentials such as food, water, fuel and ammunition had to be moved by road, and the only good road in the region ran along the coast; rail too was meagre. Eventually the Allies would gain the upper hand in the logistics battle. A combination of industrial might, largely thanks to the United States, and relentless attacks upon Axis supply routes would make all the difference. From mid-1942 Allied forces would grow stronger, while the Axis, starved of supplies, became weaker.

Gazala to Alamein

In January 1942 Rommel’s forces pushed the Allies back once again, but this time only to the Gazala line, well short of the Egyptian frontier. At the end of May, in a bold move he outflanked the Allied line with his crack armoured formations and got in behind the defences. Gazala was probably Rommel’s greatest battle, although his army came perilously close to destruction itself. Once more the Allies were in headlong retreat back to Egypt. The final catastrophe was the fall of Tobruk on 20 June.

With the British Eighth Army in disarray, Rommel sensed a real opportunity to hit them again while they were weak and before they could form a new defensive position. Going against Axis strategy, but with Hitler’s approval, Rommel’s German–Italian Panzerarmee pressed on hastily across the frontier, with Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez Canal in his sights.

Lead elements of the Panzerarmee continued eastwards on the heels of the retreating Allied troops. By the end of June Eighth Army had stopped at the El Alamein line, the most defensible position in the desert. With the sea on the northern flank and the vast, impassable Qattara Depression on the southern flank, the line was much harder to outflank, though it was 64 kilometres long.

Rommel tried to ‘bounce’ Eighth Army out of its defences on the Alamein line before they could get set. He tried a combination of direct assaults on fixed positions, along with outflanking movements, but Rommel’s forces were stopped on 1 and 2 July by brave stands, especially by South African and Indian forces. The 18th Indian Brigade at Deir el Shein was eventually overrun but not before they had knocked out 18 enemy tanks and bought some precious time. Rommel had at last been halted.

The Australian 9th Division in Syria and Palestine was rushed to the front. Arriving on 7 July they soon went on the attack, seizing the key coastal ridge near Tel el Eisa. Heavy fighting ensued as the Germans repeatedly tried to retake this key ground, without success.

During the remainder of July, Eighth Army tried to gain more important ground further south at Ruweisat Ridge and Miteiriya (‘Ruin’) Ridge. On each occasion, poor coordination and lack of adequate tank support saw British, South African, Australian, and especially New Zealand troops suffer heavy casualties, including many taken prisoner. During one action at Tel el Eisa on 22 July, Private Stan Gurney of the 2/48th Battalion won a posthumous Victoria Cross when he bayonet-charged three enemy machine-gun posts, silencing each so that his comrades could advance.

By the end of July, after a month of fighting, the Alamein line had held and Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez were safe for now. Casualties on both sides had been equally heavy. But Churchill’s growing impatience, waiting for General Claude Auchinleck to counter-attack and push the Axis out of Egypt, led to a change of command. In mid-August Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery took over command of Eighth Army.

9th Australian Division

Around 17,000 strong with a good pool of replacements, 9th Australian Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead, was full strength in personnel when it arrived back at the Alamein front. Many in the 9th Division’s ranks were experienced veterans who had fought in the desert the previous year, gaining much experience at Tobruk, though there were also many who had seen little or no action. Nevertheless they were seen as a veteran desert formation and at this critical juncture of the campaign, a most welcome addition to Eighth Army. At Tobruk the men had learned how to handle the enemy, especially in dealing with Panzer attacks from Rommel’s Africa Corps.

Morshead was a veteran of the First World War, as were many of his senior lieutenants. Known as ‘Ming the Merciless’ for his tough, no-nonsense manner and penchant for discipline and working his men hard, Morshead was easily Australia’s best fighting general. He was ably supported by very talented officers who held key positions in 9th Division. His chief of staff and GSO1, Colonel Henry Wells, artillery commander Brigadier Alan Ramsay, and engineer commander Lieutenant Colonel Robert Risson, had all been working for Morshead for some time. At Alamein their contribution to winning would be exceptional and all three were highly decorated and later knighted, as their superior had the year before. The three infantry brigade commanders were also experienced and well-respected: Brigadiers Victor Windeyer, Arthur Godfrey and David Whitehead commanding 20th, 24th and 26th Brigades.

Last Roll of the Dice

With both sides now static on the Alamein line, August was a month of reinforcement and supply. At the end of the month Rommel made one final bid to outflank Eighth Army to the south at Alam Halfa Ridge and break through. It was a disaster. Tipped off by Allied intelligence, British forces were waiting for them. His forces pounded by relentless artillery and round-the-clock air strikes, Rommel was forced to stop the attack. Lack of fuel for his Panzers and accompanying vehicles was now also a critical problem. During this phase of operations the Australians launched a diversionary raid in the north near Tel el Eisa, code-named Operation Bulimba. While inflicting heavy casualties on the opposing Germans, the 2/15th Battalion themselves suffered 173 casualties.

Intelligence, Espionage and Deception

Intelligence, espionage and deception played a very important part in the North African Campaign, especially around the time of El Alamein. Both sides employed radio intercept units to listen in on unencrypted transmissions. Much of this was routine but it helped to build a picture of enemy activities, with the occasional intelligence gem. One emerged for the Germans on 7 August 1942 when they learned that the newly-appointed British Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant General William Gott, would be flying from his desert headquarters to Cairo. German fighters intercepted his plane and Gott was killed. British radio security practices were sometimes lax, which gave their German counterparts the edge, notably through Rommel’s chief long-range signals intelligence unit, Nachrichten Fernaufklärungs Kompanie 621, led by Captain Alfred Seebohm.

Espionage provided another important intelligence channel for Rommel. In September 1941 an Italian operative in Rome secretly gained access to the US State Department Black Code cipher keys, held in the US Embassy to the Vatican. Colonel Bonner Fellers, American military attaché in Cairo, used the code to send regular messages on the Allied situation to Washington – and the enemy. In mid-June 1942 they indicated Eighth Army was at its most vulnerable, so now was the time for Rommel to strike the knockout blow and reach the Suez Canal. 

But in a few weeks Rommel suddenly lost two of his main sources of key intelligence. First, the Allies discovered the leak from the unwitting American attaché and the codes were changed, drying up Rommel’s ‘good source’. Then on 10 July during an early morning attack at Tel el Eisa near El Alamein, the Australians wiped out an Italian unit and by chance also surprised Seebohm’s radio intercept unit. All were either killed or captured. Rommel was furious when he learned what had happened.

But the Allies had by far the most important intelligence asset. Codenamed Ultra, this highly secret source distributed information from German transmissions deciphered by the British Enigma cryptographic machines. On the battlefield, Ultra provided German operational plans at key moments – such as 30 June 1942 for their initial thrust to break through at El Alamein, then at the end of August when Rommel tried again at Alam Halfa. But more significantly, Ultra provided intelligence that allowed the Royal Navy and the Desert Air Force to continually intercept and sink Axis ships bringing supplies for Rommel’s army.

After Rommel was turned back at Alam Halfa, the next seven weeks saw intense preparations for Montgomery’s big offensive. The pressure was on as Churchill badly wanted a victory ahead of the Anglo–American landings in Northwest Africa, scheduled for early November. Training and preparations were intense as every detail was gone over and anticipation reached fever pitch.

Eighth Army had a two-to-one advantage over the Axis forces ranged against them on the Alamein line. In rough figures the Allies had about 220,000 men, 1,000 tanks, nearly 900 guns, and 1,500 anti-tank guns, supported by some 530 aircraft. Rommel’s Panzerarmee had approximately 108,000 men (about half Germans), 550 tanks, 550 guns and 1,000 anti-tank guns supported by 350 aircraft. To bolster their defences the Axis had laid some half-million mines in dense belts across their front.

As the largest set-piece battle in North Africa, the Allied offensive had all the hallmarks of a major Western Front battle of the previous war. Indeed, some older men on both sides would later remark on it. A massive artillery bombardment using pinpoint, predicted fire would accompany the infantry advance onto their objectives – enemy trenches and strong points protected by massed machine-guns and barbed wire. But if anything, this battle would be even more intense than anything in 1918. This battlefield would be infested with thousands of mines and booby traps and hundreds of tanks, far more mobile and deadly than twenty years before, duelling one other. And from above, attacking aircraft would land devastating blows as well.

Crumbling

At precisely 9.40 pm on 23 October the Allied artillery barrage of some 900 guns opened up simultaneously. For fifteen minutes they pounded enemy positions. Then they suddenly stopped. Five minutes later, at exactly 10 pm, they opened up again with even greater intensity as the infantry got up out of their holes in the ground and advanced. While XIII Corps in the south launched some supporting attacks, the main thrust was made by XXX Corps in the northern sector. Arrayed north to south were the 9th Australian, 51st Highland, 2nd New Zealand, 1st South African and 4th Indian Divisions. They were to break into the enemy positions and clear two separate lanes for the tanks of X Corps to break through. While most of the infantry objectives were reached during the night, the British armour was unable to get through the tough defences.

While holding off enemy counterattacks, the Australians were tasked with resuming their attacks, this time turning northwards and advancing to towards the coast. This move was intended to ‘crumble’ away at the enemy infantry strength and threaten to cut off their forces on the coast. Increasingly fierce fighting ensued as the Australians ground their way forward. Most Australian casualties would occur during this phase as their progress drew upon them Rommel’s best troops and strongest armoured units – the entire Africa Corps.

On the night of 25/26 October, 26th Brigade moved west to capture the vital high ground at Trig 29, then drove northwards to the Fig Orchard. An innovative attack saw C Company of the 2/48th Battalion arrive on Trig 29 in Bren gun carriers just as the artillery barrage lifted, taking the German defenders by surprise. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued but the Australians prevailed. Private Percy Gratwick won the Victoria Cross that night for charging a nearby enemy strong point that had his company pinned down. With grenades and bayonet he eliminated the enemy but it cost him his life.

Over the next two days the Australians endured and repulsed some twenty-five enemy attacks trying to re-take Trig 29, but they held on thanks largely to artillery and anti-tank gun support, and their own grim determination.

On the night of 30/31 October, the Australians drove forward once again, biting deeper into the heart of the enemy defences. They battled northwards through the Fig Orchard, to Thompson’s Post, then across the railway line to a large depression called ‘the Saucer’. It would become the scene of even more intense and bitter fighting. 2/32nd Battalion captured a railway worker’s hut, called ‘the blockhouse’, which became an aid post where both German and Australian doctors worked side-by-side. Meanwhile two battalions of the now severely depleted 26th Brigade pushed back eastwards along the road and railway. While they made good progress, inflicting heavy casualties on the Germans, the 2/24th and 2/48th were now critically low in numbers and were unable to hold their gains. They had to pull back. Once more, a man of the 2/48th, Sergeant Bill Kibby, went above and beyond the call of duty by sacrificing himself to save the pinned-down remnants of his company. His was another posthumous VC.

Holding on

The infantry units were now so low in numbers that Morshead decided to send in the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion to continue the attack across the road, to Barrel Hill, then the coast. By dawn on the 31st the pioneers, fighting in their first infantry battle, found themselves in a terribly exposed position. Fighting continued throughout the day. At one point a German officer came forward to suggest the pioneers should surrender. The defiant response was, “If you want us, come and get us!” And come for them they did. Fighting raged on throughout the day until, just as German Panzers appeared to finish off the Australians, British tanks arrived. The pioneers hugged the ground as a tank battle exploded around them. When the enemy were finally driven off, the Australians still held the ground.

The next night Morshead conducted a very difficult and risky move. With 26th Brigade now so few in numbers and at the end of their endurance, overnight the 24th Brigade was brought in to take their place. For a few hours the Australian sector was highly vulnerable to a German breakthrough, had they known what was happening. But they didn’t and the relief was effected. The Australians were very good at night operations – the Africa Corps, not so.

9th Division had to hold on for just one more day before the reorganised British armour would once more attempt the decisive breakthrough. Again they endured numerous attacks to try and dislodge them, but by the early hours of 2 November the Germans gave up. Away to the south, things were happening. Operation Supercharge was led by 2nd New Zealand Division, with tanks attached. 9th Armoured Brigade sacrificed itself that day losing nearly all its tanks, but now the enemy defences began to crack. Two days later X Corps tanks broke through and the Axis line was finally shattered. On the afternoon of 4 November Rommel ordered a full retreat.

Aftermath

Ultimately it was a decisive Allied victory. From then on, Axis forces in North Africa were doomed. They retreated all the way back to western Libya, then as the Allies landed in Northwest Africa on 8 November, they withdrew into Tunisia. Trapped between two Allied armies and finally cornered in May 1943, some 230–250,000 Italian and German troops surrendered at Tunis. It was another major blow to the Axis, on the heels of the disaster at Stalingrad.

Eighth Army’s casualties for this decisive battle at El Alamein totalled 13,560. Rommel’s Panzerarmee lost some 60,000, including around 35,000 taken prisoner. The Australian 9th Division’s casualties reflected the key part they had played in the battle, enduring much of the heaviest fighting. At 2,694 they amounted to 20 percent of the Army’s losses, including 620 killed and nearly 2,000 wounded. From early July to 5 November, Australian casualties stood at almost 5,500 of whom 1,259 had been killed. For this fine division and for the nation, it was a heavy price to pay.

The vital part the Australians had played at Alamein was recognised by many at the time, including Generals Alexander and Montgomery. Twenty-five years later, Montgomery reflected, ‘The more I think of it, the more I realise that winning was only made possible by the bravery of the 9th Australian Division.’ Yet Tobruk and Kokoda became better remembered and lionised in Australia, mostly because they were clearly Australian affairs, whereas at Alamein the 9th Division was only part of a larger Allied force.

Australians should better remember El Alamein for a number of reasons. It was the largest and most important battle of the campaign in North Africa. Our 9th Division played a prominent and important role as part of a combined Allied effort. Our casualties had been high – almost 5,500 between July and November. At this mid-point of the war, Alamein was also a much-needed Allied victory. After two years of crushing defeats, victory at El Alamein provided a much-needed boost in morale. The church bells were indeed rung and as Churchill put it, “It might almost be said, before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat.”

Further Reading

Australian Official History, Vol. III: Tobruk & Alamein / Barton Maughan (1966)

Alamein: The Australian Story / Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley (2002)

Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein / Niall Barr (2004)